British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):287-298 (2000)
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown () argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise the probability of the hypothesis as legitimately as any such confirmation does. I shall argue in particular that despite its dependence on perception we can use naturalized epistemology to confirm the reliability of a perceptual process without circularity.
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Citations of this work BETA
Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):207-236.
A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs.Tomoji Shogenji - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
What is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
Introduction: The Providential Bad Luck of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):483-491.
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