Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119 (1981)

Sydney Shoemaker
Cornell University
Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper
Keywords Functionalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Lewis, D
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ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics198112145
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