This paper examines the epistemic status of the reflective belief about the content of one’s own conscious mental state, with emphasis on perceptual experience. I propose that the process that gives a special epistemic status to a reflective belief is not observation, inference, or conceptual articulation, but semantic ascent similar to the transition from a sentence in the object language to a sentence in the meta-language that affirms the truth of the original sentence. This account of the process of reflection explains why a reflective belief is (subject to some qualification) infallible.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Functional Role Semantics and Reflective Equilibrium.Simone Gozzano - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (38):62-76.
On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: A Sellarsian Perspective.Dan D. Crawford - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:107-123.
Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. [REVIEW]Richard Schantz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191.
Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW]Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1999 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.
Sosa on Epistemic Circularity and Reflective Knowledge.Noah Lemos - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #124,916 of 2,177,979 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,206 of 2,177,979 )
How can I increase my downloads?