Bioethics 24 (9):481-489 (2010)
AbstractIt has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each case that the significant work is being done by a relation other than identity
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise.William Simkulet - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (2):93-98.
The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
Demented patients and the quandaries of identity: setting the problem, advancing a proposal.Giovanni Boniolo - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-16.
Metaphysics and the Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):419-434.
Similar books and articles
The Significance of Personal Identity to Abortion.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Bioethics 25 (4):230-232.
Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem?E. Furberg - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self.Gerard P. Montague - unknown
Identity: Personal Identity, Characterization Identity, and Mental Disorder.Jennifer Radden - 2004 - In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 133--46.