Consciousness might matter very much

Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-22 (2005)
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Peter Carruthers argues that phenomenal consciousness might not matter very much either for the purpose of determining which nonhuman animals are appropriate objects of moral sympathy, or for the purpose of explaining for the similarities in behavior of humans and nonhumans. Carruthers bases these claims on his version of a dispositionalist higher-order thought (DHOT) theory of consciousness which allows that much of human behavior is the result of first-order beliefs that need not be conscious, and that prima facie judgments about the importance of consciousness are due to confabulation. We argue briefly against his claim that 'the moral landscape can remain unchanged' even if all or nearly all nonhuman animals are taken to be incapable of conscious experience. We then show how a first-order representational (FOR) theory of consciousness might be defended against Carruthers' criticisms. Finally, we argue that Carruthers' appeal to confabulation undercuts his own arguments for an evolutionary explanation for consciousness, posing a greater epiphenomenalist threat to his DHOT theory than he concedes.



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Author Profiles

Adam Shriver
Drake University
C. David Allen
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

A Three-Person Model of Empathy.Fritz Breithaupt - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):84-91.
Carruthers' marvelous magical mindreading machine.Charlie Lewis & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):152-152.

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