Martin Shuster
Goucher College
In this article, I examine Cavell's understanding and deployment of the catego-ries of 'evil' and the 'monstrous' in The Claim of Reason. Arguing that these notions can-not be understood apart from Cavell's reliance on the notion of an 'internal relation,' I trace this notion to its Wittgensteinian roots. Ultimately, I show that Cavell's view of evil allows us to navigate between two horns of a classic dilemma in thinking about evil: it al-lows us to see evil as neither a privation nor as a positive force with supra-human po-tency
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DOI 10.4000/ejpap.901
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