Beyond the Humphrey Objection

I defend counterpart theory against post-Kripkean objections. Trenton Merricks objects that no construction of ersatz counterparts is uniquely and intrinsically suitable; I reply that metaphysical constructions need not have these features. Sarah Moss refutes my solution (from "All the world's a stage") to the problem of timeless counting for temporal counterpart theory; I offer a new solution. Hazen, Fara, Williamson, and others have objected that counterpart theory generates an unacceptable logic for an actuality operator; I attempt to give a better semantics.
Keywords Counterpart theory  Stage theory  Actuality  Arbitrariness  Reduction
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Sarah Moss (2012). Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.
Emanuel Viebahn (2013). Counting Stages. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):311-324.

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Murali Ramachandran (2008). Kripkean Counterpart Theory. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):89-106.

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