Criteria of personal identity and the limits of conceptual analysis

Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):189-209 (2001)
When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is correct.
Keywords Conceptual Analysis  Continuity  Criteria  Existence  Metaphysics  Persistence  Personal Identity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.10
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,751
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.
The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Identities of Persons.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) - 1976 - University of California Press.
Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
The Concept of Personal Identity.Steven Rieber - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
Recent Work on Identity Over Time.Theodore Sider - 2000 - Philosophical Books 41 (2):81–89.
Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity?Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 242.
Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity.Michael C. Rea & David Silver - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):185-194.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

249 ( #12,677 of 2,146,811 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

27 ( #11,336 of 2,146,811 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums