Contextualism, Pluralism, and Distributive Justice

Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1):172 (1983)
Abstract
THE INAPPLICABILITY THESIS There is a gap between the idea of distributive justice and the many factors that are morally relevant for decision making on economic issues. Only to a degree can this gap be attributed to the distance between “ideal reach” and “practical grasp,” to the legitimate difference in detail between an abstractly delineated economic scenario and a concrete set of circumstances, and to the disparate idioms and metaphors of theoretical and practical discourse. Rather, the gap indicates a fundamental problem with the concept of distributive justice. The problem, that is here termed the “inapplicability thesis,” is that even if distributive justice in abstract formulation were to be accepted as a value, its application in economic decision making is indeterminate
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S026505250000340X
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,865
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Distributive Justice, Injustice and Beyond Justice.Wei Xiaopin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:857-872.
The Many, Not the Few: Pluralism About Global Distributive Justice.Helena de Bres - 2012 - Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (3):314-340.
A Defence of Democratic Egalitarianism.Sagar Sanyal - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):413-34.
Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.Klaus R. Scherer (ed.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-31

Total downloads
16 ( #374,410 of 2,293,799 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #410,358 of 2,293,799 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature