Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231 (1997)

Authors
Theodore Sider
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will attempt to resolve this dispute in favor of four dimensionalism by means of a novel argument based on considerations of vagueness. But before argument in this area can be productive, I believe we must become much clearer than is customary about exactly what the dispute is, for the usual ways of formulating the dispute are flawed, especially where three dimensionalism is concerned
Keywords Persistence
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Reprint years 2001
ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI 10.2307/2998357
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References found in this work BETA

Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Can There Be Vague Objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Brutal Composition.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
The Concept of Identity.Eli Hirsch - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Parthood and Identity Across Time.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.

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Citations of this work BETA

Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
Ontological Anti-Realism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
In Defence of Ground.Michael J. Raven - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):687 - 701.

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