Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):415-430 (2000)
Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a ‘duplication case’-a case just like the first, but for an additional, ‘external’ element which provides an equal or better ‘candidate’ for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of continuity of function/form to be one-one by non-branching or closest competitor clauses. The obvious intrinsic approach-perhaps taken for granted-appeals to considerations of quantity of matter, requiring over 50% shared matter between identicals . But this rules out plausible cases of halving and doubling for which there are not duplication cases. After bringing out this problem, I ask what makes duplication cases possible, and use this to formulate an intrinsic condition which allows identity whenever there is continuity of function, but no threat to intrinsic ness via duplication cases
|Keywords||persistence, identity, intrinsicness, best candidate approach, fission, fusion, duplication|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts.Katherine Hawley - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
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