Noûs 48 (3):565-572 (2014)
Eli Hirsch has argued in many places that non-commonsensical ontological claims just couldn't be true, since there is strong metasemantic pressure to charitably interpret natural language---correct interpretations must, unless all else is highly unequal, count a sentence (especially a perceptual sentence) as true if ordinary speakers regard it as being obviously true. In previous work I replied that ontologists can stipulatively introduce a new language, "Ontologese", that is exempt from this pressure toward charity. Hirsch has recently objected to this proposal; this paper is my reply.
|Keywords||Hirsch Ontologese Meta-ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense.Eli Hirsch - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.
Citations of this work BETA
Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room.Daniel Z. Korman - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):298-321.
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