Hirsch's Attack on Ontologese

Noûs 48 (3):565-572 (2014)
Eli Hirsch has argued in many places that non-commonsensical ontological claims just couldn't be true, since there is strong metasemantic pressure to charitably interpret natural language---correct interpretations must, unless all else is highly unequal, count a sentence (especially a perceptual sentence) as true if ordinary speakers regard it as being obviously true. In previous work I replied that ontologists can stipulatively introduce a new language, "Ontologese", that is exempt from this pressure toward charity. Hirsch has recently objected to this proposal; this paper is my reply.
Keywords Hirsch  Ontologese  Meta-ontology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00868.x
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References found in this work BETA
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense.Eli Hirsch - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.

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