Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?

Analysis 51 (4):265 - 271 (1991)
Act Utilitarianisms divide into Total and Average versions. Total versions seem to imply Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”. Average versions are proposed in part to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but these are subject to “Mere Addition” arguments as detailed by Hudson in “The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People”. Thus, various intermediate versions of utilitarianism, such as the one investigated by Hurka in “Value and Population Size”, take on interest. But Hudson argues that such compromise theories are subject to the mere addition arguments, and are therefore no improvement over Average Utilitarianism. I disagree: some such compromise solutions escape Hudson’s Mere Addition arguments.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/51.4.265
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Scott Hill (2011). An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.

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