Naturalness and arbitrariness

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):283 - 301 (1996)
Peter Forrest and D.M. Armstrong have given an argument against a theory of naturalness proposed by David Lewis based on the fact that ordered pairs can be constructed from sets in any of a number of different ways. 1. I think the argument is good, but requires a more thorough defense. Moreover, the argument has important consequences that have not been noticed. I introduce a version of Lewis’s proposal in section one, and then in section two I present and defend my version of the argument. After addressing a worry about my argument in section three, in section four I argue that a similar “argument from arbitrariness” jeopardizes Lewis’s solution to the Kripke/Wittgenstein puzzle of the content of thought.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372787
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
David Lewis (1986). Against Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.

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Kris McDaniel (2006). Modal Realisms. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331.

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