On the prospects for a theory of personal identity
Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):351-72 (1999)
Abstract
Much specific support for theories of personal identity comes from data which is really about 'what matters' in identity. I argue that if we accept Parfit's arguments that identity is not sufficient for what matters, then we should think our subject matter is actually underdetermined and indefinite, and there can be no correct answer to the question 'Under what conditions is P2 identical to P!?'Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0276-2080
DOI
10.5840/philtopics1999261/228
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Citations of this work
Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
Community-Made Selves.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):459-470.
Assessor Relative Conativism.Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
