Paleo-compatibilism and buddhist reductionism

Sophia 47 (1):29-42 (2008)
Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.
Keywords Compatibilism  Buddhism  Reductionism  Semantic dualism  Śāntideva  Moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0043-x
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