Are Dennett’s Evolutionary Debunking By-Producing Arguments against the Rationality of Theism Valid?


Abstract
Resumen Recientemente la ciencia cognitiva de la religión ha permitido desarrollar argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, los cuales buscan poner en entredicho no solo la racionalidad sino la verdad del teísmo. Dado que hay dos formas de concebir la racionalidad y la justificación epistémicas, a saber, la internalista y la externalista, cabe preguntarse ¿de qué modo tales argumentos afectan al teísmo? El objetivo de este artículo es responder a esta cuestión mediante una reconstrucción y evaluación de tres argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores subproductistas contra la racionalidad del teísmo que Dennett sostendría. Sostendré que solo uno de los tres argumentos de Dennett es posiblemente válido. igualmente, mostraré que el argumento adicional del sesgo cognitivo es probablemente exitoso en socavar la justificación internalista y externalista del teísmo. Finalmente, mostraré que estos argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores pueden ser invalidados indirectamente a partir del argumento evolutivo desacreditador en contra del naturalismo desarrollado por Plantinga, al cual se le puede contraponer el argumento lógico cancelador de la epistemología reformada.Recently, the cognitive science of religion has allowed the development of evolutionary debunking arguments, which seek to challenge not only rationality but the truth of theism. Since there are two ways of conceiving epistemic rationality and justification, viz., the internalist and the externalist, one may wonder ¿how such arguments affect theism? The purpose of this article is to answer this question through a reconstruction and evaluation of three evolutionary debunking arguments against the rationality of theism that Dennett would hold. I will argue that only one of the three Dennett's evolutionary debunking arguments is possibly valid. I will also show that the argument of cognitive bias is probably successful in undermining both the internalist and externalist justification of theism, under certain conditions. Finally, I will show that this arguments can be indirectly disproved from evolutionary argument against naturalism developped by Plantinga, argument to which one can counterpose logical defeater argument against the reformed epistemology.
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DOI 10.14482/eidos.26.8749
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References found in this work BETA

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.

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