Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22 (2005)

Authors
Mark Siebel
University of Oldenburg
Abstract
To have a propositional attitude, a thinker must possess the concepts included in its content. Surprisingly, this rather trivial principle refl ects badly on many theories of concept possession because, in its light, they seem to require too much. To solve this problem, I point out an ambiguity in attributions of the form 'S possesses the concept of Fs'. There is an undemanding sense which is involved in the given principle, whereas the theoretical claims concern a stronger sense which can be brought out by formulations such as 'S has an adequate conception of Fs' or 'S knows what Fs are'
Keywords Concept  Conceptualization  Epistemology  Possession  Puzzle
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1163/18756735-068001001
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):609-612.
A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge.Gareth Evans - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.

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