Charles Siewert
Rice University
Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion of non-conceptual higher order representation that has not been explained so as to make it clear we have warrant for applying it to our own experience
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.

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Is Experience Transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.

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