Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification

Noûs 46 (2) (2012)
Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
Keywords cognitive penetration  perception
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Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.

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