Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification

Noûs 46 (2) (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.

Other Versions

reprint Siegel, Susanna (2018) "Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification". In Fantl, Jeremy, McGrath, Matthew, Sosa, Ernest, Contemporary epistemology: an anthology, pp. : Wiley (2018)

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Author's Profile

Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

References found in this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Internalism defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
The perils of dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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