Epistemic Charge

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306 (2015)
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Abstract

I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.

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original Siegel, Susanna (2015) "XV—Epistemic Charge". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115(3pt3):277-306

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
Bias and Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 99-115.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

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