Epistemic Charge

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306 (2015)

Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.
Keywords epistemology of perception  justification
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00395.x
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

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