Philosophia Scientiae 13 (2):85-96 (2009)

Abstract
Around 1918 Hermann Weyl resisted the logicists’ attempt to reduce mathematics to logic and set theory. His philosophical points of reference were Husserl and Fichte. In the 1920s, Weyl distinguished between the position of these two philosophers and separated the conceptual affinity between intuitionism and phenomenology from the affinity between formalism and constructivism. Not long after Weyl had done so, Oskar Becker adopted a similar distinction. In contrast to the phenomenologist Becker, however, Weyl assumed the superiority of active Fichtean constructivism over the passive Husserlian view of essences. The present paper discusses this development in Weyl’s thought. Though not all of Weyl’s claims about Husserl and Fichte can be maintained in detail, I will argue for the general plausibility of Weyl’s distinction.RésuméVers 1918 Hermann Weyl abandonnait le logicisme et donc la tentative de réduire les mathématiques à la logique et la théorie des ensembles. Au niveau philosophique, ses points de référence furent ensuite Husserl et Fichte. Dans les années 1920 il distingua leurs positions, entre une direction intuitionniste-phénoménologique d’un côté, et formaliste-constructiviste de l’autre. Peu après Weyl, Oskar Becker adopta une distinction similaire. Mais à la différence du phénoménologue Becker, Weyl considérait l’approche active du constructivisme de Fichte comme supérieure à la vision d’essences passive de Husserl. Dans cet essai, je montre ce développement dans la pensée de Weyl. Bien que certains points dans sa réception de Husserl et Fichte ne soient pas soutenables, je vais argumenter en faveur de la distinction fondamentale mentionnée ci-dessus
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DOI 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.295
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Riemann’s and Helmholtz-Lie’s Problems of Space From Weyl’s Relativistic Perspective.Julien Bernard - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 61:41-56.
The Constitution of Weyl’s Pure Infinitesimal World Geometry.C. D. McCoy - 2022 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 12 (1):189–208.
Becker–Blaschke Problem of Space.Julien Bernard - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):251-266.

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