Inference Without Reckoning

In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31 (2019)

Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligence of the response.
Keywords inference  justification
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References found in this work BETA

Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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Citations of this work BETA

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.

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