Legal System and Practical Reason. On the Structure of a Normative Theory of Law

Ratio Juris 5 (3):288-307 (1992)
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It will be argued, firstly, that there is a link between the legal validity of a norm and the rational justifiability of a requirement that judges should apply this norm, based on a normative conception of legal validity and the postulate that judges should act as rational persons; secondly, that rational justifiability of legal norms requires the construction of a legal system in a model of principles that differs from theories, e.g., of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin and Alexy, which are not fully adequate for a normative conception of law



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References found in this work

The concept of law.Hla Hart - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Taking rights seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - London: Duckworth.
Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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