Misperception


Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
Sense Experiences and Their Contents: A Defense of the Propositional Account.Michael Pendlebury - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):215-30.
The Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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