In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York, USA: Routledge (2017)

Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
Keywords high-level contents of perception  consciousness  perception  perceptual experience
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

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