The Contents of Visual Experience

Oxford University Press USA (2010)

Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2010, 2011, 2012
Buy the book $11.15 used (83% off)   $43.45 new (34% off)   $65.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780199931248     9780195305296   0195305299
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,992
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
Automatically Minded.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11).
Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading.Joel Smith - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293.

View all 82 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Visual Contents: Beyond Reach?Kristjan Laasik - 2015 - Philosophical Forum 46 (2):193-204.
How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-42.
Can We See Natural Kind Properties?René Jagnow - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):183-205.
Reply to Campbell.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
Reply to Prinz.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character.Richard Price - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):508-518.
Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.
Susanna Siegel's the Contents of Visual Experience.John Campbell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):819-826.
Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?Andy Clark - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-04-17

Total views
168 ( #38,703 of 2,319,701 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #19,592 of 2,319,701 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature