The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination

In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224 (2008)

Abstract

Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects.Peter Thomas Geach - 1957 - London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

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Citations of this work

The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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