The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722 (2013)
Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0059-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.

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