The real challenge to free will and responsibility

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4 (2008)
Abstract
Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness.
Keywords free will  personal responsibility  new compatibilism
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DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2007.10.005
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility.Adina L. Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.

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