The role of perception in demonstrative reference

Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-21 (2002)

Authors
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Abstract
Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
Keywords Demonstratives  Intention  Intentionality  Reference  Bach, K  Kaplan, D  Mcginn, C  Reimer, M  Wettstein, H
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Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Shifty Characters.Eliot Michaelson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):519-540.
A Defence of Intentionalism About Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Fictional Singular Imaginings.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 273--299.
The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.

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