Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21 (2002)
Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
|Keywords||Demonstratives Intention Intentionality Reference Bach, K Kaplan, D Mcginn, C Reimer, M Wettstein, H|
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Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives.Michael Glanzberg & Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):1–42.
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Accommodation and Negotiation with Context‐Sensitive Expressions.Alex Silk - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):115-123.
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