The role of perception in demonstrative reference

Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21 (2002)
Abstract
Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
Keywords Demonstratives  Intention  Intentionality  Reference  Bach, K  Kaplan, D  Mcginn, C  Reimer, M  Wettstein, H
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Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Shifty Characters.Eliot Michaelson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):519-540.
Accommodation and Negotiation with Context‐Sensitive Expressions.Alex Silk - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):115-123.

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