Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):374-394 (2017)

Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
Nicholas Silins
Cornell University
We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).
Keywords episodic memory  personal memory  attention
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1080/24740500.2017.1411153
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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