Why non-monotonic logic is inadequate to represent balancing arguments

Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):211-219 (2003)
Abstract
This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its structure. Moreover, it argues that as far as the argumentation consists in logical inferences, deductive logic suffices for reconstructing the argumentation from the internal point of view of someone making normative judgements.
Keywords argumentation  defeasible reasoning  internal point of view  legal reasoning  normative arguments  weighing and balancing
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DOI 10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046010.14101.04
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On Balance.Marc Lauritsen - 2015 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (1):23-42.

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