Which properties are represented in perception

In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,442

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is there a problem about nonconceptual content?Jeff Speaks - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.
Perceiving pictures.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Moral perception and moral knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
Specular highlights as a guide to perceptual content.Michael Madary - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,042 (#6,907)

6 months
37 (#35,896)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.

View all 229 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references