In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. London, UK: (forthcoming)

Authors
Katrina L. Sifferd
Elmhurst College
Abstract
Empirical research has distinguished moral judgments that focus on an act and the actor’s intention or mental states, and those that focus on results of an action and then seek a causal actor. Studies indicate these two types of judgments may result from a “dual-process system” of moral judgment (Cushman 2008, Kneer and Machery 2019). Results-oriented judgements may be subject to the problem of resultant moral luck because different results can arise from the same action and intention. While some argue luck should not bear on persons’ culpability, Victor Kumar has argued that the tendency to hold unlucky agents responsible for harm is justified by consequentialist aims of punishment (Kumar 2019). In contrast, judgments that focus on acts and intentions may be primarily retributive. Kumar claims that judgments focused on results track external, public harm because this increases the reliability of punishment and better achieves instrumental aims, including deterrent effect. In this chapter I examine rape cases using Kumar’s theory of punishment. Rape involves outcomes that are not publicly available. If judgments of punishment depend on outcomes, then we would expect such judgments to be less stable for those instances of wrongdoing that lack public outcomes such as rape, because such judgments would rely instead on often biased and unreliable inferential processes to establish the presence of mental states, which are essentially private. In this way Kumar’s theory actually predicts the way in which we see criminal justice institutions fail with regard to arrest, prosecution, and punishment related to rape; and we might expect similar failures for other crimes that lack publicly available results. In sum, a fundamental problem with institutionalized punishment centered upon results may be that some crimes sit within a moral blindspot.
Keywords dual-process theory of moral judgment   rape   punishment
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 50:115-151.
Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.
Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck.Victor Kumar - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):987-1007.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Injury and Relational Harm: Analyzing Rape in Darfur.Sarah Clark Miller - 2009 - Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (4):504-523.
A Dilemma in Rape Crisis and a Contribution From Philosophy.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 1 (8):93.
Just War Theory, Crimes of War, and War Rape.Sally Scholz - 2006 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1):143-157.
Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?Helen Reece - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (3):445-473.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-08-16

Total views
52 ( #215,883 of 2,497,995 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #29,159 of 2,497,995 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes