An Inductive Modal Approach for the Logic of Epistemic Inconsistency

Abstracta 6 (1):136-155 (2010)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to extent a specific paranormal modal logic in such a way as obtain a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic able to formalize the notions of plausibility and certainty. With this logic at hand, and this is our second purpose, we shall use a modified version of Reiter‘s default logic to build a sort of inductive logic of plausibility and certainty able to represent some basic principles of epistemic inductive reasoning, such as a negative autoepistemic principle, an `error-prone feature of induction' principle and a confirmation by enumeration principle

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Ricardo Silvestre
Federal University of Campina Grande

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References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.Newton C. A. da Costa - 1974 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (4):497-510.
Nearly every normal modal logic is paranormal.Joao Marcos - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):279-300.

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