- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic
In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108 (2008)
Abstract
My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nico Silins - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.
Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.
Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism.Mark Satta - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (3):202-224.
Pryor’s Dogmatism Against the Skeptic.Eunjin Lee - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
Testimonial justification: the parity argument.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):385-406.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-04-06
Downloads
2,167 (#6,133)
6 months
166 (#26,590)
2009-04-06
Downloads
2,167 (#6,133)
6 months
166 (#26,590)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker, Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.
The epistemic significance of perceptual learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
References found in this work
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-99fc7d78b-6fxz5 uwo