Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746 (2019)

Authors
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Abstract
Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases, and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.
Keywords belief  knowledge
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12273
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.
Belief is Prior to Knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.
Knowing.Michael David Roth - 1970 - New York: Random House.
On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.
Knowledge is Normal Belief.B. Ball - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):159-177.
A Note on Jaakko Hintikka’s “Knowledge and Belief”.Paul Weingartner - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 49 (1):135-147.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-10-19

Total views
23 ( #423,072 of 2,325,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,827 of 2,325,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes