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Abstract
It is usually accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than conditional ones. This article goes against this popular belief by advancing the contrarian hypothesis that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones due to the way our assumptions support our assertions. In fact, considering the coherentist process by which most of our different beliefs mutually support themselves, the only genuine example of unconditional statements are cases of self-justified beliefs, but these examples are controversial and few and far between. The distinction between unconditional and conditional statements is similar to the distinction between assumptions and premises in that is a largely conventional idealisation that results from our attempts to limit epistemic complexity.
Keywords conditionals  belief system  inferential justification  idealised model  conventionalism
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The Cement of the Universe.J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Idealization and the Aims of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2017 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.

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