Philosophy of Science 80 (5):958-970 (2013)
AbstractSeveral articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences
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Citations of this work
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References found in this work
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The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
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After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science.Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):1-27.