Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?

Authors
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Abstract
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification as well as to defend phenomenal “conservatism” and other views besides. In what follows I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal “conservatism”. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and show why this needn’t raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification’s basing demand seemed to.
Keywords justification  doxastic Justification  propositional Justification  conservatism  phenomenal conservatism  basing relation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.962553
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva Jr - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-08-19

Total downloads
154 ( #38,569 of 2,286,041 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #37,151 of 2,286,041 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature