Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style

Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930 (2018)
Authors
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Abstract
There are two different kinds of enkratic principles for belief: evidential enkratic principles and normative enkratic principles. It’s frequently taken for granted that there’s not an important difference between them. But evidential enkratic principles are undermined by considerations that gain no traction at all against their normative counterparts. The idea that such an asymmetry exists between evidential and normative enkratic principles is surprising all on its own. It is also something that calls out for explanation. Similarly, the considerations that undermine evidential enkratic principles also undermine certain narrow-scope evidential principles. This too generates explanatory questions. I show how a knowledge-first view of rationality can easily address these explanatory questions. Thus we have one more reason to put knowledge first in epistemology.
Keywords enkrasia  akrasia  rationality  justification  knowledge-first
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0987-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?Paul Silva - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67.
The Motivation Question.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3413-3430.
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
Editorial.Julian Fink - 2013 - Organon F 20 (4):422-424.
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
The Basis of Self-Knowledge.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):3-18.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-09-18

Total downloads
30 ( #213,160 of 2,293,670 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #26,781 of 2,293,670 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature