Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program

Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625 (2023)
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Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the reasons-for relation (inspired by Alston) and show how it limits the applicability of Schroeder’s arguments.


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Author Profiles

Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne

Citations of this work

Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence.Paul Silva - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):1012-1018.

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References found in this work

Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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