Husserl's Phenomenology and Weyl's Predictivism

Synthese 110 (2):277 - 296 (1997)
In this paper I discuss the version of predicative analysis put forward by Hermann Weyl in "Das Kontinuum". I try to establish how much of the underlying motivation for Weyl's position may be due to his acceptance of a phenomenological philosophical perspective. More specifically, I analyze Weyl's philosophical ideas in connexion with the work of Husserl, in particular "Logische Untersuchungen" and "Ideen I". I believe that this interpretation of Weyl can clarify the views on mathematical existence and mathematical intuition which are implicit in "Das Kontinuum".
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Concept Formation and Scientific Objectivity: Weyl’s Turn Against Husserl.Iulian D. Toader - 2013 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (2):281-305.

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