Episteme 16 (3):262-281 (2019)

Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
ABSTRACTWhat conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief? Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that any adequate account of group justification must be sensitive to both the evidence actually possessed by enough of a group's operative members as well as the evidence those members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to Lackey's specific view of group justification and a range of concrete case intuitions any plausible view of group justification must explain. I then offer an alternative view of group justification where the basic idea is that group justification is a matter of groups responsibly responding to their total evidence. This view both avoids the problems facing Lackey's account and also explains the relevant concrete case intuitions.
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2018.5
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References found in this work BETA

Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemology of Groups.Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Oxford University Press.

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