Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact

In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge (2021)
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When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other.



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Author Profiles

Eyal Tal
University of Arizona (PhD)
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne

Citations of this work

Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.
In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.
Knowledge-First Theories of Justification.Paul Silva - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence.Paul Silva - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):1012-1018.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

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