On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs

Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955 (2015)

Authors
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Abstract
According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that afford one propositional justification in the absence of an ability to acquire doxastic justification. In what follows I show Turri’s novel position to be problematic and go on to suggest a more modest revision to orthodoxy. The first section presents the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and Turri’s counterexample to it. The second section introduces Turri’s novel view of that relationship and draws out some of its epistemological implications. The third section gives counterexamples to Turri’s proposal. The fourth section defends a modest revision to orthodoxy
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9690-1
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References found in this work BETA

Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Priority of Propositional Justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía 59 (59):167-182.
Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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