Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1) (2017)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.
|
| Keywords | justification permissibility goodness blamelessness transmission failure internalism/externalism |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1111/papq.12085 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
View all 103 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence. Routledge.
Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
Moral Motivation and the Affective Appeal.Jennifer Corns & Robert Cowan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):71-94.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Externalism and Understanding: Toward a Unified Account of Epistemic Justification.Mark Allen Bross - 2003 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
Is There Room for Justified Beliefs Without Evidence? A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):137-152.
Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.Jessica Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339–348.
Values, Circumstances, and Epistemic Justification.Rosalind S. Simson - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):373-391.
Justification and the Right to Believe.Jeffrey Glick - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):532-544.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
True Belief at the End of the Tether : The Quest for Universal Epistemic Justification.Sam Thellman - unknown
Riggs on Strong Justification.Joel Katzav - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):631 – 639.
On Empty Compliments and Deceptive Detours: A Neopragmatist Response to Theodore W. Nunez.Nancy Frankenberry - 1999 - Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (1):129 - 136.
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2014-08-22
Total views
945 ( #6,845 of 2,505,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #14,379 of 2,505,620 )
2014-08-22
Total views
945 ( #6,845 of 2,505,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #14,379 of 2,505,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
