The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

Authors
Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Abstract
According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.
Keywords justification  permissibility  goodness  blamelessness  transmission failure  internalism/externalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12085
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

View all 85 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva Jr - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-17.
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Justification-Skepticism.Todd Rudolph Long - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
Values, Circumstances, and Epistemic Justification.Rosalind S. Simson - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):373-391.
What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Justification and the Right to Believe.Jeffrey Glick - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):532-544.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva Jr - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Riggs on Strong Justification.Joel Katzav - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):631 – 639.
Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-08-22

Total downloads
742 ( #2,717 of 2,293,671 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #22,273 of 2,293,671 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature