Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, is not the truth values of its propositional contents. Extensional evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny its logical consequences in two circumstances: (1) when her acceptance is based on intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a proposition she accepts because she doesn’t know what are the truth-values of its propositional contents; (2) when she accepts a proposition based on extensional evidence, but thinks that this evidence is insufficient to establish its logical consequences, which would require intensional evidence. It is argued that this tension is responsible for the counter-intuitive aspects of the material account of conditionals involving the negation of conditionals, hypothetical syllogism, contraposition and the inferential passage from disjunctions to conditionals (or-to-if). This tension is also behind some known puzzles involving conditionals, namely, conditional stand-offs, Adam pairs, the cheating partner example, the problem of counterfactuals, the burglar’s puzzle and the jump-out conditionals. It is shown that this tension is always dissolved in favour of extensional evidence, since intensional evidence is defeasible, while extensional evidence is not. Thus, it is irrational to deny the logical consequences of an accepted proposition due to its reliance on intensional evidence and ignorance of its extensional evidence.
Keywords intensional evidence  extensional evidence  conditionals  counterfactuals  material conditionals
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On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.

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