Legal Theory 25 (2):132-152 (2019)

Authors
Alex Silk
University of Birmingham
Abstract
It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, the metaphysics/metasemantics of (legal) content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.
Keywords philosophy of law  vagueness  legal indeterminacy  rule of law  law  epistemicism  contextualism  legal interpretation  sorites paradox
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DOI 10.1017/s1352325219000028
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References found in this work BETA

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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press UK.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford University Press USA.

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